The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation has received many questions in connection with the US withdrawal from the Treaty on Open Skies. We are publishing answers to the most topical questions.

The Treaty on Open Skies is an agreement aiming to boost trust in the military sphere. The treaty is filled with complicated technical provisions concerning observation aircraft and equipment, equipment certification, the planning of observation missions, observation flight quotas, maximum range, etc. Obviously, this is why the public at large, as well as the political and parliamentary circles of the signatory states have not paid too much attention to the treaty for almost 30 years.

Today, media outlets are talking about the treaty more often in connection with the US withdrawal from it. However, some publications contain inaccurate facts or biased analyses that reflect the views of the treaty’s opponents in the United States.

But they are completely disregarding the positions of others, including the Russian Federation’s position. This unofficial document is based on facts, rather than conjecture, and aims to rectify this situation.

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Question: Is it true that the Treaty on Open Skies benefits Russia more than other participants, including the United States?

Answer: If this were the case, the Russian Parliament would not have hesitated before ratifying this treaty nine years ago. Years ago, our Western partners urged us to complete the ratification process more quickly. The opening of Russian territory to aerial observation was a very difficult decision, especially since Russia has to host many more flights than any other signatory state. We have hosted over 500 observation missions under the treaty.

The treaty is based on the principle of equal rights and obligations. Each signatory state has the right to conduct the same number of observation flights over any other signatory state, as they do it.

However, Russian aircraft do not fly over the United States alone. The United States hosts five to six Russian missions each year. And our other Western partners mostly focus their interest on Russia, Belarus and, partially, Ukraine. They conduct few flights over other countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia. By the way, the United States conducts about 100 percent more flights over Russian territory, either by itself or together with other signatory states, than Russia does over US territory.

It is also important to note that the treaty allows the signatory states to obtain observation flight materials from each other. And, if one state’s aircraft flies over Russia, then that state can share the information with its allies, for example. And NATO countries do not fly over each other. Thus, we are unable to obtain materials from anyone. This circumstance largely makes the information balance, as stipulated in the treaty, detrimental to Russian interests.

But, these problems notwithstanding, Russia believes that the treaty is useful for all its participants. It facilitates greater trust and, therefore, European security.

This is why when, in the summer of 2014, politicians in Kiev and in some Western countries were loudly claiming that there was a build-up of Russian forces on the border with Ukraine, Russia did not object to Open Skies missions in this area. In all, 19 observation flights were conducted, and the materials prove convincingly that there was no build-up.

This and other examples show that, for many years, Russia has been doing everything possible to preserve the treaty’s viability, even when something has to be waived for this purpose. This is inconsistent with statements that Russia is taking certain advantages allegedly stemming from the treaty.

In addition, Russia has to maintain two points of entry and exit, 13 Open Skies and refueling airfields, as well as 28 standby airfields, to facilitate almost weekly observation flights by the treaty’s signatory states over the Russian Federation.

These statistics simply do not compare with the parameters of the other signatory states in implementing the treaty.

Question: This could be so when it comes to figures. But was Russia not the first among TOS countries to create digital observation equipment? You just have “better eyes” and hence collect better information.

Answer: The concept of digitalising observation equipment was advanced by the United States when its industry reduced the manufacture of film for aerial survey.

It should also be pointed out that the TOS restricts the visual acuity you mentioned, that is, the resolution. Under the treaty, the technology used on Open Skies flights must have a maximum resolution of 30 centimetres for both analogue and digital equipment. By creating a digital camera, Russia has not acquired the ability to receive more detailed images.

The specifications of the observation equipment are checked during the inspection of every new observation aircraft and new observation equipment. Based on expert conclusions of the signatory countries, the lowest possible observation altitudes that comply with the treaty restrictions are approved.

Question: But there must be an opportunity for Russia to receive information exceeding TOS restrictions or to use covert camera technology?

Answer: This is exactly what the Soviet Union, and possibly other countries, feared when the treaty was drafted. This is why the treaty and subsequent related decisions approved measures that preclude this. The observation aircraft and equipment are carefully checked to prevent this in certification and during pre-flight inspections.

For example, the camera windows of the observation aircraft have special covers that preclude unwarranted filming. These covers have special seals or are structured so that they can be dismantled and installed on the ground. The treaty procedures stipulate the inspection of these covers at all transit airports after the aircraft’s arrival at the point of entry and after its transfer to the airfield from which it will take off for the observation flight, so as to see that observation equipment was not used during the transit flight.

In addition, such inspections include not only the aircraft and its equipment but also the software used to convert the initial data received by the aircraft to a format understandable for all signatory states.

During the observation mission, representatives of the host country accompany the Open Skies mission and fly on board the observation plane during its mission to ensure compliance with the treaty.

Question: Why does Russia film the critical infrastructure in the United States and Europe? US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Moscow is doing this for targeting it with precision-guided conventional munitions.

Answer: When the treaty was drafted, the United States insisted that the entire territory of the signatory states be open to observation flights without exception. It clearly had the Soviet Union and later Russia in mind, forgetting about the principle of reciprocity. Russia is using its rights under the treaty and always acts strictly in accordance with its provisions. The United States never expressed any complaints about our activities before.

As for the United States, it should be said that its observation planes film not only parks and beaches when flying over Russia, but also a great number of other facilities, including civilian infrastructure. Washington could probably disclose the list of these images, using the occasion to refresh its own memory as well.

Question: You have improperly limited the length of flights over the Kaliningrad Region. This violation makes it impossible to observe Russia’s entire territory in the agreed-upon number of flights and reduces the efficiency of observation flights. Are you hiding some military facilities in Kaliningrad from Open Skies aircraft cameras?

Answer: In reality everything is much simpler. Some of our partners, who had the right to make observation flights from the Open Skies airfield in Kubinka near Moscow, with the range of up to 5,500 km from there, used a significant part of their quota in 2012-2014 (about 1,600 km) over the Kaliningrad Region. They repeatedly crossed it back and forth, thereby creating problems for the use of the region’s limited air space and the region’s only international airport, Khrabrobo Airport (Slides 1 and 2). This also entailed serious financial costs. Our attempts to agree on some reasonable restraint didn’t get anywhere. So we had to minimise costs by announcing the maximum range of flights over the Kaliningrad Region (500 km). This does not run counter the treaty or subsequent decisions made by the participants.

Limits on the maximum range of flights over the Kaliningrad Region were introduced in conformity with the treaty’s provisions (Annex E, paragraphs 4 and 5 A) and Decision No. 3/04 of the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) (Subparagraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c)). The current rules were introduced with consideration for the participating state to allocate an additional number of Open Skies airfields and establish a maximum range from them. These rules do not increase the number of flights needed to observe Russia’s entire territory (because of the overall range of flights of 5,500 km). These rules make it easier to observe the territory of the Kaliningrad Region as compared to the rest of Russia and the territory of other participating states, including our neighbours (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). As we understood it, our Western colleagues, including the US, had no grievances in this respect. That said, the range of a flight (500 km) makes it possible to observe any place during a flight over the Kaliningrad Region, no matter how far it is from an Open Skies airfield. In other words, the original efficiency of observation is preserved.

Finally, it should be noted that in February of this year Russia allowed a mission involving the US, Lithuania and Estonia to fly over the Kaliningrad Region with a range of 505 km (Slide 3). We hope that this goodwill gesture will pave the way for agreements on the peculiarities of observation flights over this region.

Question: But nobody but Russia has established such sub-limits on flights over part of its territory, right?

Answer: We established these restrictions based on the Kaliningrad Region’s geographical peculiarities (an exclave separated from Russia’s main territory). We also used a precedent created by our US colleagues when they established a maximum flight range over the Alaska semi-exclave.

Let’s look at flights over Alaska and compare our positions: (Slide 4):

– The Kaliningrad Region is a semi-exclave like Alaska is for the US;

– An Open Skies airfield has been allocated for observing the territory of the Kaliningrad Region like it has been in Alaska;

– Like in Alaska, a maximum flight range has been established in line with the Subparagraph 5(a) of Annex E to the Treaty.

As you can see, the sides use identical positions on the observation of the compared territories.

But if you compare the territory that can be observed during one observation flight, it covers up to 77 to 98 percent of Kaliningrad, whereas for Alaska it is only 2.7 percent (Slide 5). Therefore, the efficiency of every observation flight over the Kaliningrad Region is 28-36 times higher than for flights over the territory of Alaska.

Question: Why does Russia ban reconnaissance flights within 10 kilometre zones of the Russian-Georgian border?

Answer: Your very question reflects the essence of the problem. It shows the Western perception of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as Georgian regions. Having recognised them as independent nations, Russia had to comply with the provision of Paragraph 2, Section II, Article VI, whereby the flight path of an observation aircraft shall not be closer than ten kilometres from the border with an adjacent State that is not a State Party. Thus the problem is based on political differences. The instruments in the Treaty on Open Skies are apparently unfit for settling political disagreements. It is just not designed for that.

In any case, 10-kilometre zones are small and are just 0.02 percent of Russia’s total area (Slide 6) and technically, with certain observation equipment configurations, they can surely obtain images of these areas without flying over them. 

Meanwhile, the entire territory of Georgia is inaccessible to Russian Open Skies missions as well as multi-state missions with Russia’s participation. Thus, Georgia is violating the key provisions of the Treaty on Open Skies (Paragraph 1 of Article I and Paragraph 2, Section I of Article III), which say that the Treaty is designed for the conduct of observation flights by States Parties over the territories of other States Parties, and that each State Party shall be obliged to accept observation flights over its territory. However, it appears that gross violation never bothered the US or other advocates of “faultless compliance” with the treaty even when no observation flight could be conducted under the Opens Skies Treaty in 2018 due to Georgia’s destructive policy. Obviously, regardless of their thunderous declaration on the treaty’s value for security architecture in the region from Vancouver to Vladivostok, they are ready to sacrifice this agreement for the sake of stepping up Tbilisi’s political ambitions and push it towards a confrontation with Russia.  

To maintain the treaty and overcome the deadlock, we cancelled bans on flights in the 10-kilometre zones along Russia’s border in the Caucasus. Yet we reserved the right to revisit the issue in the future and warned that observation flights in the above zones would become permanent only if Georgia fulfilled its obligations on accepting Russian missions in good faith. This is an irrefutable part of Russia’s statement.  

Unfortunately, Tbilisi’s disruptive policy remains unchanged at this point. As a result, Russia was forced to deny an observation flight within 10-kilometre zones during a joint mission of Sweden, Germany and the US over our territory in April 2019. 

The resumption of observation flights under the Treaty on Open Skies in 2019 after a year of suspension caused by Georgia’s disruptive stance, was made possible entirely owing to Russia’s responsible approach. We did not ask for a quota for flights over Georgia even though we had every right to do so.

Russia is ready to allow observation missions to these areas on condition that Georgia gives up its current position, which is incompatible with the key provisions of the treaty, and allows Russian flights over its territory. Actually, a variant of a “technical” resolution regarding allowing observation flights without damaging political views of the parties on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was considered possible in 2018 in the US Department of State report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments. Regretfully, Washington prefers to forget this.  

We call on our partners not to politicise the treaty and to contribute to the search for a solution to existing problems. 

Question: The US also accuses Russia of using the Treaty on Open Skies to impose its position on the status of Crimea. You have designated an Open Skies airport on the peninsula, haven’t you? 

Answer: In 2014, Crimea and Sevastopol joined Russia based on the expression of the will of the people. Our country takes a responsible attitude towards its commitments under the Treaty on Open Skies which contains the information necessary for improving observation flights over the peninsula. Our colleagues have the option to use this right. By the way, if we hadn’t done this, the US would have accused Russia that, in this case, it had allegedly concealed military facilities in Crimea from observation.

Question: The US Department of State recent Executive Summary of the 2020 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Compliance Report) issued in April 2020 mentions one more Russian violation of the Open Skies Treaty in September 2019 during the Tsentr-2019 military exercise, namely, the ban on fulfilling part of an agreed-upon plan of the US-Canadian mission. What can you say on this score?

Answer:  The Russian Federation completely fulfils its obligations to ensure transparent military activity, including military exercises. We intend to adhere to this practice in the future, as required by the Open Skies Treaty.

This is evidenced by the fact that Russia fully approved the planned US-Canadian mission, namely, its first and second observation flight segments, without any changes during the Tsentr-2019 military exercise.

A subsequent ban by air traffic control divisions on conducting the second flight segment on September 20 was solely motivated by the need to guarantee flight safety during a highly complicated situation in the skies over the exercise area.  The pace of this exercise, which involved diverse aviation elements, air defence forces and resources, did not allow air traffic control divisions to ensure safe air space for the planned Open Skies flight.

Members of the Russian supporting team did their best to organise the second observation flight segment. We were ready to put off its deadlines and to increase its duration in excess of the Treaty’s deadlines, that is, for the period of delay. However, members of the observation mission turned down our proposals and therefore failed to conduct the second observation flight segment.

In our opinion, it would have been highly irresponsible to endanger members of the observation mission. By the way, other parties to the Treaty often use this argument, while refusing to allow Russia to conduct observation flights.

Question: Unlike Russia, Western parties to the Treaty do not violate it. In any event, the above-mentioned Compliance Report of the US Department of State contains precisely this conclusion.

Answer: First of all, it should be noted that independent US experts on the Open Skies Treaty, including those who directly monitored compliance with it, repeatedly voiced at Congressional hearings and other venues their disagreement with the interpretation of Russian actions as violations.

Why are these accusations fabricated? On the one hand, this can probably be explained by a desire to divert public attention from the truly serious violations of the Open SkiesTreaty and failure to honour its provisions by the United States, their allies and “client” states. On the other hand, this can be explained by a negative attitude of some Congress members and the US military establishment towards the Treaty itself, their striving to fabricate “legal grounds” for their own efforts to wreck yet another military-political agreement.

Unfortunately, the report, as usual, overlooks problems regarding US compliance with the Treaty.

First: In 2015, the United States failed to ensure the safe arrival of Russia’s Antonov An-30B observation aircraft to the point of entry/exit by refusing to provide the required number of transit airfields. The US position has not changed so far. This is a violation of the Open Skies Treaty on the part of the United States.

Second: In 2017, US authorities cancelled overnight accommodation for the crews of observation aircraft at the refuelling airfields of the Robins, Ellsworth, as well as Travis and Elmendorf air force bases. This violates the rights of the observing side to conduct maximum range observation flights, with due consideration for the crews’ heavy workloads. This is seen as a flight safety matter.

Third: The United States set the maximum range of observation flights over the territory of the Hawaii Islands from a refuelling airfield at Hickam Air Force Base. At the same time, under the Treaty, the maximum range of flights is only stipulated from Open Skies airfield and is calculated under certain rules. Consequently, the maximum, 900-kilometre length of flights, stipulated by the US contrary to the Treaty’s provisions, does not conform to the Treaty. Because, according to more objective calculations, this range should be at least 1,160 kilometres.

Fourth: The United States set restrictions for observation flights over the territory of the Aleutian Islands when an observing side’s aircraft should always remain within the boundaries of the adjacent zone stretching for 24 nautical miles from the coast. This restriction, not stipulated by the Open Skies Treaty, considerably reduces the efficiency of observation flights over US territory.

Additionally, the absence of overnight accommodation at the King Salmon and Cold Bay refuelling airfields during observation missions also impacts flight safety because the crews of observation aircraft have to work longer shifts, up to 14̶ 16 hours.

Fifth: The United States places altitude restrictions during observation flights over its territory. These restrictions, not stipulated by the Treaty, run counter to ICAO recommendations noting that a special regime for using air space should be introduced for ensuring the flights of military aircraft.

We have questions for some other signatory states. But we don’t consider this to be sufficient grounds for withdrawing from the Open Skies Treaty and slamming the door. We are ready to discuss mutual grievances, provided that this discussion is conducted on an equitable and mutually respectful basis and will not boil down to categorical demands of concessions from Russia.

Question: Nevertheless, an increasing number of media reports point to the US administration’s intention to withdraw from the treaty. Is the reason national security concerns or economic considerations, since the manufacturing of observation equipment, let alone aircraft, will not come cheap?

Answer: We have already discussed the issue of national security concerns. They are not justified, given the extremely strict and precise requirements of the treaty and subsequent decisions. During the inspection of the Russian An-30B observation plane carrying digital observation equipment in September 2013, US experts, the only ones among the representatives of dozens of other states, refused to sign the permission without any explanation of their decision. Our American partners only allowed the observation flight eight months later, having failed to find an acceptable reason to deny it.

Russia knows that strict compliance with the treaty requirements costs a lot of money. We have not only created digital observation equipment and modernised our planes so as to carry it, but we also designed a new observation aircraft, Tu-214ON. Other countries are following in our footsteps, in particular, Germany and Romania, which plan a preliminary certification of the new equipment in October 2020. By the way, US planes have been equipped with digital cameras as well.

Regrettably, the United States has postponed certification indefinitely. Funding is hardly a decisive matter for Washington. Even if our American partners were unable to modernise their observation planes in the medium term, they could discuss the lease or joint use of such aircraft with their European partners.

In our opinion, the real reason is the current US administration’s negative attitude to arms control in general and, in particular, to the arms control agreements signed by preceding administrations. The United States has always called for maximum transparency in the military area, but only in the case of other countries. It may sound paradoxical, but the very possibility of foreign observation flights over the US territory is often seen as a threat to national security, the erosion of sovereignty or simply as an affront to national pride. As of now, such flights are only permitted under the New START and Open Skies treaties. Their future is dim because of Washington’s uncertainty regarding them.

Frankly, this US attitude to the Open Skies Treaty is reminiscent of the Soviet policy between the 1960s and 1980s, when the Kremlin looked at control that is not linked to disarmament as legalised spying. But we at least had a reason for suspicion: regular flights by the U-2 spy planes over our territory seriously undermined trust in the idea of open skies. However, the current US position looks like inconsistency and lack of continuity in foreign policy, considering that the idea had been proposed by President Eisenhower and the treaty itself was signed by President George H. W. Bush. By the way, both were Republicans. Moreover, this policy makes one doubt our American partners’ ability to honour their commitment to and calls for transparency in military matters, for example, through the modernisation of the Vienna Document.

Question: Who will stand to lose more from the demise of the Open Skies Treaty? Is there any replacement for it, for example, satellite images?

Answer: The countries that have cutting-edge national technical verification equipment, primarily satellites, may be able to replace part of the information previously provided under the treaty. They will only replace part of the data because it is much more difficult and expensive to retarget satellites and hence change their orbits than to send an observation plane. Moreover, planes can fly underneath clouds.

Those European states that do not have satellites will face more problems. They should not expect the United States to generously share its satellite images with them.

At the same time, Washington is unlikely to maintain access to the entire range of information it currently receives under the Open Skies Treaty if it withdraws from it.

On a bigger scale, all signatory states of the treaty and ultimately European security will be the losers. First of all, the treaty helps to de-escalate tensions and precludes any misinterpretation of the sides’ military intentions, which is exactly what NATO says we should avoid. Second, it is a crucial instrument of military interaction and collaboration, which is building up confidence as it is. In light of the obvious shortage of common European dialogue platforms on military security, it will be very difficult to make up for the loss of this vital channel of professional communication. And lastly, the less openness there is, the less trust and, consequently, security there will be, which will have to be ensured through other, more expensive methods.

We hope that political realism and constructive policies of the Open Skies Treaty signatories will prevent this.

Source: MFA of Russia